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INTRODUCTION
In September 2005, Sanofi-Aventis, the makers of the allergy
tablet Allegra, announced plans that it would launch a generic
version of its drug in the marketplace.1 Sanofi-Aventis had
recently lost a court battle to Barr Pharmaceuticals in connection
with Allegra patents, which marked the end of Allegra’s exclusive
claim on the market.2 This move by Sanofi-Aventis to launch a
generic Allegra can be seen as a new permutation of its battle with
Barr Pharmaceuticals; however, instead of combating in court,
Sanofi-Aventis has found a new mode of attack in the marketplace.
The battle between such pharmaceutical companies as SanofiAventis and Barr Pharmaceuticals can be classically deemed a
struggle for economic profit. Generally, the process of bringing a
new drug to market takes about twelve years, and typically costs a
pharmaceutical company around $359 million.3 It has been
estimated that only one in five thousand of a pharmaceutical
company’s compounds make it to the second round of testing
while only one in five of those receive final approval.4
Pharmaceutical companies take huge gambles for the hard-earned
right to sell new drugs to consumers and should rightly expect to
1
See Sanofi-Aventis, Press Release, Sanofi-aventis group enters agreement with
Prasco Laboratories to market generic versions of ALLEGRA® (fexofenadine HCl),
(Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://en.sanofi-aventis.com/press/ppc_26088.asp?
ComponentID=26088&SourcePageID=24929.
2
See In re Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D. N.J. 2005).
3
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D:
COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS, OTA–H–522, at 15 (Feb. 1993), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk1/1993/9336_n.html [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT].
4
CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
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recoup their investment and make a profit. Pharmaceutical
companies arguably provide a public good in the form of useful
products that benefit the public’s welfare. While patent rights
guarantee market exclusivity for a finite period to innovator
pharmaceutical companies (“innovators”),5 one debated issue in
the pharmaceutical industry revolves around the transition time
between the innovators’ market exclusivity and the generic drug
manufacturers’ (“generics”) entry into the market.
Most innovators want to hold off any dilution of their market
by generic drugs that compete with their brand-name product for as
long as possible.6 The financial incentive to do so is clear.
However, a battle over the billion dollar drug market7 inevitably
ensues as the generics seek to gain access to the market to profit on
the sale of new drugs.
One new and controversial tactic employed by innovators in
this battle is the “authorized generic.”8 An authorized generic is a
brand-name drug which is licensed by an innovator to another
company to be marketed as a generic drug.9 This tactic may seem
counterintuitive because, as noted before, the innovators aim to
keep generic competition off the market for as long as possible.
However, this tactic is employed in very specific situations. Under
certain circumstances, a single generic manufacturer is awarded
the right to have exclusive entry in the generic market before other
generics.10 The exclusive entry by a generic drug manufacturer

5

35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (stating that a person who, without authority, makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention during the term of the patent infringes the
patent).
6
See CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at
19–21.
7
Drug Pricing & Consumer Costs: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Commerce
Committee, 107th Cong. 3 (Apr. 23, 2003) (statement of Kathleen D. Jaeger, President &
CEO, Generic Pharmaceutical Association), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
hearings/042302jaegar.pdf (stating that consumers spent $121.8 billion on prescription
drugs) [hereinafter Jaeger Senate Hearing Statement].
8
See Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P–0563, at 4 (Dec. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04p0563/04p-0563-cp0000-01vol1.pdf [hereinafter Andrx Petition].
9
Id.
10
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (Supp. 2005); see infra Part I.B.
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constitutes the first arrival of an innovator’s competition in the
market.
In this context, the innovator might find the practice of
marketing authorized generics to be useful. The innovator might
find it more profitable to simultaneously market its brand-name
drug at a higher, brand-name price and also sell the drug under a
generic label at a lower, generic price. Such a practice would both
increase sales profits and undercut the market of the exclusiveentry generic manufacturer because of increased competition by
the authorized generic on the market.
Fundamentally, this practice seems unfair to consumers
because the exact same drug, manufactured by the same innovator,
is offered for sale at two different prices, but only one of the drugs
bears the brand-name label. Although the practice of authorizing
generics may be a result of the warfare between innovators and
generics, it also preys on the inaccurate beliefs of many consumers
that generic drugs contain slightly different active ingredients or
lower doses of the same ingredients than brand-name drugs.11
Consumers may benefit from cheaper prices offered in the generic
market for the first time for the drug, but the lack of disclosure is
still problematic. If a consumer were aware that a generic drug
was actually a brand-name drug sold at a lower price, he would
most likely be unwilling to pay a premium for the brand-name
drug with the “correct” label.
Complicating the mix even further are the rights of the generic
companies. Once several companies are manufacturing and
marketing a generic drug, each generic manufacturer, individually,
might feel little impact from the addition of another generic on the
market. However, the impact would be felt in the circumstance
where a single generic manufacturer is awarded the right of
exclusive entry in the generic market. The authorized generic
would undercut the market of the exclusive-entry generic and may
force the exclusive-entry generic to lower its price.
The battle between innovators and generics over market entry
has taken various turns in the last decade,12 but the use of
11
12

Andrx Petition, supra note 8, at 2.
See discussion infra Part I.C.

BETH

2005]

2/3/2006 11:28 AM

AUTHORIZED GENERICS

359

authorized generics has sharply increased in the last few years.13
In 2003, Congress enacted The Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act14 (“Medicare Amendments”)
to foster greater access to affordable health care. The legislation
was enacted in part to restore a balance between the interests of
innovators and generics, which had been upset because of the
abuse of previous legislation by innovators.15 Specifically, the
Medicare Amendments addressed a number of issues that had
arisen in the interpretation of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments.16 For several years, a number of
loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments were exploited by
innovators who sought to keep a corner on the market for the drugs
they had developed.17 The Medicare Amendments sought to
restore a balance between the generics and innovators by
addressing those loopholes.18 Currently, the new controversial
tactic of authorized generics employed by innovators arguably
defeats the purpose of the recent legislation. However, the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and federal courts have found
the use of authorized generics to be statutorily permissible.19
Part I of this Note explains the history of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments with a particular focus on the original intent of the
law which sought to improve consumer access to affordable
prescription drugs. Part II explains the Medicare Amendments,
which sought to maintain the balance between the competing
13

Glenn Singer, Industry’s Biggest Manufacturers Enter Generics Through Loophole;
Consumers, Smaller Firms Could Suffer, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 10, 2005, at 1E.
14
Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
15
Representative Henry A. Waxman, Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals (May 8,
2002),
http://www.house.gov/waxman/news_files/news_statements_afford_drugs_5_
8_02.htm (describing the objective of the legislation as restoring the balance intended by
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments by encouraging low-cost generic drugs and rewarding
brand name drug companies) [hereinafter Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on
Affordable Pharmaceuticals].
16
Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
17
See discussion infra Part I.C.
18
See Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra
note 15.
19
See discussion infra Part III.
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interests of generics and innovators and to achieve the goals
embodied in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Part III explores
the current controversial use of authorized generics by innovators
to capture a share of the market and the state of the law regarding
that tactic. Part IV of this Note evaluates the legal analysis which
permits innovators to profit from authorized generics. Part V of
this Note offers a possible resolution to the use of authorized
generics. This Note argues that the use of authorized generics
upsets the careful balance between innovators and generics, which
is a central tenet of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the
Medicare Amendments.20 Finally, this Note suggests that a
restriction on an innovator’s use of authorized generics through
drug labeling would accomplish greater access to affordable
pharmaceuticals by fostering balance between innovators and
generics.
I. History of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Amendments)
A. The 1962 Amendment of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act
The FDA is the regulatory body that controls nearly every
aspect of the development and marketing of pharmaceuticals,
including clinical testing, the safety and effectiveness of new
drugs, as well as the contents of advertisements for drugs.21
Without FDA approval, no new drug can be marketed in the
United States.22 In order to improve the safety and effectiveness of
pharmaceuticals, Congress passed legislation in 1962 that
dramatically altered the drug approval process.23 The 1962
20

See Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra
note 15.
21
See United States Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov (last visited
Oct. 26, 2005).
22
See Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C § 355(a) (2000) (requiring FDA
approval for new drugs).
23
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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Amendment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”) requires the FDA to positively determine that a drug is
safe before it enters commercial distribution and to consider
whether new drugs are effective for the purposes for which they
are intended.24
A manufacturer seeking to market a drug that has not
previously been approved by the FDA is required by the FDCA to
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the FDA.25 NDAs are
usually long and detailed. They must include, among other things,
evidence regarding the drug’s safety and effectiveness and
information about any patents held by the NDA that could
reasonably be asserted to cover the drug in question.26
Specifically, the application must contain the patent number and
expiration date of any patent claiming the drug or a method of
using the drug upon which the NDA holder could file a claim of
patent infringement “if a person not licensed by the owner
engag[es] in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”27 After the
NDA is approved, the FDA is required to publish the submitted
patent information in a report called “Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” which is commonly
referred to as the Orange Book.28
Under the 1962 Amendment, both innovators and generics had
to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of their drug products
through clinical trials.29 Therefore, if a generic wanted to market a
drug after the innovator’s patent had expired, the generic would
have to repeat extensive clinical trials to prove the drug’s safety
and effectiveness to the FDA.30 A generic took the risk of having a
24

Id. at 784.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b) (1999), amended by 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1) (Supp. 2005).
26
Id.
27
See id. § 355(b)(1).
28
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2000); see also Electronic Orange Book: Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
29
Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 396–97 (1999).
30
Joseph P. Reid, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter a Pill for the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309,
314 (1999).
25
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patent infringement suit filed against it by an innovator if the
generic began conducting these trials before the drug patent
expired.31

B. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984
In the early 1980s, both houses of Congress introduced bills to
expedite generic drug approvals and to stimulate competition
between innovators and generics.32 However, it was not until the
98th Congress (1983-1985), when Representative Henry Waxman,
Senator Orrin Hatch, and members of the innovator and generic
drug industries began negotiations, that the Hatch-Waxman
legislation was enacted.33 The Hatch-Waxman legislation “was
predicated on the desire to enhance the growth of the generic drug
industry while simultaneously extending patent protection for
brand name drugs developed by the research-based industry.”34
The Senate and House approved S. 2748 and H.R. 3605,
respectively, in September 1984.35 President Ronald Reagan
signed the Hatch-Waxman Amendments into law on September
24, 1984.36 In the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Congress
attempted to strike a balance between two competing policy
interests: (i) encouraging the research and development of new
drugs and (ii) enabling generics to bring low-cost copies of those
drugs to market.37
For innovators, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments provide a
number of incentives, including: (i) patent term extensions to
compensate for delays during regulatory review of the brand-name
product;38 (ii) mandatory notice by generics seeking to challenge
31

See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
See Frederick Tong, Widening the Bottleneck of Pharmaceutical Patent Exclusivity,
24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775 (2003).
33
See id. at 780–82.
34
Bill To Ease Way for Generics Is Introduced in the House, CHAIN DRUG REV., June
4, 2001, at RX11.
35
Engelberg, supra note 29, at 404.
36
Id.
37
See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
38
See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
32
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patents covering the brand-name drug;39 (iii) up to a thirty-month
stay of generic approval during patent litigation;40 and (iv) market
exclusivity of three and five-year periods under special
circumstances.41
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments favor the interests of
generics by allowing for an efficient regulatory proposal known as
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).42 In an
ANDA, a generic must demonstrate its drug’s “bioequivalence”
with the previously approved brand-name product.43 However,
ANDA applicants may rely on the innovator’s previous studies and
are no longer required to repeat the expensive and lengthy clinical
trials that had been required by law.44 To establish bioequivalence,
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments require that a generic drug must
have the same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage
form, strength, and labeling requirements as the brand-name drug
approved in an NDA.45 Although these requirements are stringent,
establishing bioequivalence poses less of a burden than satisfying
the requirements to complete an NDA application because the
ANDA applicant is able to rely on the FDA’s findings of safety
and effectiveness for the brand-name drug. 46 As a result, generics
are able to shorten the time period for approval and avoid much of
the research and development costs that would be otherwise
necessary to bring a new drug to market.
In the interest of innovators, however, the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments continue to provide protection to the innovator
whose patent rights have yet to expire. In order to secure FDA
approval, the ANDA applicant must certify that its generic version
of the approved drug will not interfere with any patents that the
39

See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. 2005).
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
41
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (awarding a five-year market exclusivity to companies
innovating drugs containing a new chemical entity, and awarding companies making
improvements to already improved drugs three years of exclusivity).
42
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (1999), amended by U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (Supp. 2005).
43
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(F) (2000).
44
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (1999), amended by U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (Supp. 2005); see
also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(3) (2005).
45
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii), (j)(4)(D)(i)–(ii) (2000).
46
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).
40
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NDA holder has listed.47 That is, the ANDA applicant must certify
one of the following for each patent listed in the Orange Book that
claims the drug for which the ANDA applicant is seeking
approval: (i) no such patent information has been submitted to the
FDA; (ii) the patent has expired; (iii) the patent is set to expire on a
certain date; or (iv) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new generic drug for which the
ANDA application is submitted.48 These are commonly referred to
as paragraph I, II, III and IV certifications. The first three
certifications can be handled directly by the FDA, but the fourth
certification requires a court’s involvement because it necessitates
a determination of whether the patent is valid or whether it will be
infringed by the generic.49
To balance the interests of innovators and generics, the HatchWaxman Amendments require that, after filing a paragraph IV
certification, an ANDA applicant who wishes to challenge the
patent during the patent term must give notice to the NDAholder/patentee within twenty days of the filing.50 The notice must
include a statement detailing the factual and legal basis upon which
the ANDA applicant’s belief rests that the patent is invalid or will
not be infringed.51 If the certification is under paragraph IV, “the
approval shall be made effective immediately”52 unless the patent
holder files an infringement action in the district court within fortyfive days of receiving the notice.53 If the patent holder files suit,
“the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the
thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the
notice,”54 unless the district court rules on the infringement claim
within the thirty-month period55 or the patent expires. If the
district court issues a ruling during the thirty-month stay period,
the ANDA approval date is determined by the decision of the
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV).
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i)–(iii) (Supp. 2005).
See id. § 355(b)(3)(B)(i).
See id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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district court, or by the decision of the appellate court, if it is
appealed.56 During the forty-five day period in which the patent
holder can file an infringement action, the ANDA applicant is
barred from filing a declaratory judgment action with respect to the
patent at issue.57 If no infringement action is filed during this
forty-five day period, the FDA may immediately approve the
ANDA.58
For generics, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments give further
incentives to the first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV
certification. The generic who files an ANDA application first and
successfully litigates an ensuing patent dispute is granted a 180day period of marketing exclusivity.59 During this period, the FDA
may not approve a subsequent generic applicant’s ANDA
application for the same drug product.60 The innovator’s premiumpriced, brand-name product is the only product competing with the
generic that obtains the exclusive marketing period. Generics are
therefore given an economic incentive to challenge the validity of
listed patents.61 Under the original Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
this six-month exclusivity period typically began on the date of the
first commercial marketing of the drug by the first applicant.62
However, the original Hatch-Waxman Amendments also provided
that the commencement of the exclusivity period could be
triggered by “the date of a decision of a court . . . [which holds] the
patent which is the subject of the certification [is] invalid or not
infringed.”63
In order to deal with potential patent infringement concerns,
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments provide that it is not an act of
patent infringement to engage in acts necessary to prepare an
56

See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa), (II)(aa)(AA).
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), (j)(5)(C).
58
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
59
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
60
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at 13 (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter FTC GENERIC DRUG
STUDY].
61
See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 60, at 57.
62
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2005).
63
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–58 (2003).
57
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ANDA application which would otherwise constitute infringing
acts.64 However, the Act also provides that, if an ANDA applicant
attempts to obtain approval for a generic drug claimed by a valid
and unexpired patent, the applicant infringes a patent by filing an
ANDA.65 In this context, no monetary damages would exist
because the generic would not have yet sold any product because
the thirty-month stay provision would have been triggered by the
infringement suit.66 Therefore, the innovator would not have
suffered from the activities of the generic manufacturer. In
exceptional cases, an ANDA applicant may be penalized for
willfully infringing a patent.67 In cases of willful infringement, the
patentee is awarded reasonable attorney’s fees.68
C. Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
In the years following enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
legislation, the generic drug industry experienced significant
growth.69 The availability of generic drugs increased and the
generic share in the overall prescription drug market grew from 19
percent in 1984 to 45 percent in 2001 and realized more than $11
billion in annual sales.70 A 1998 study by the Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”), comparing brand-name and generic prices
for twenty-one different brand-name drugs facing generic
competition between 1991 and 1993, found that the average retail
price of a generic prescription drug in 1994 was less than half the

64

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
See id. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
66
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2005).
67
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
68
Id.
69
Jaeger Senate Hearing Statement, supra note 7, at 3; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND
RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at ix (July 1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf [hereinafter CBO REPORT ON EFFECT
OF GENERIC DRUGS IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY].
70
Jaeger Senate Hearing Statement, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that consumers spent
$11 billion on generic drugs and that 45 percent of prescription drugs sold were generic);
CBO REPORT ON EFFECT OF GENERIC DRUGS IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note
69, at ix (finding that 19 percent of prescription drugs sold were generic).
65
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average retail price of a brand-name prescription drug.71 The CBO
study estimated that “in 1994, purchasers saved a total of $8 billion
to $10 billion on prescriptions at retail pharmacies by substituting
generic drugs for their brand-name counterparts.”72
According to the CBO study, generic competition was also
good for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. “Between
1983 and 1995, investment in [research and development] as a
percentage of pharmaceutical sales by brand-name drug companies
increased from 14.7 percent to 19.4 percent. Over the same period,
U.S. pharmaceutical sales by those companies rose from $17
billion to $57 billion . . . .”73 The effect of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments also benefited innovators by extending their average
exclusive marketing period. The average period of time between
the entrance of a brand-name drug into the market and the
expiration of its patent increased from nine years in 1984 to eleven
or twelve years during the years 1992 through 1995.74
In spite of the legislation, the market is still dominated by
brand-name pharmaceuticals. Although a generic drug may
immediately capture about 60 percent of the market share within
its first year of entry, the price for a generic drug is, on average,
only 61 percent of the price for a brand-name drug during the first
month of entry by the generic drug and drops to 37 percent within
two years.75 More significantly, by the year 2000, the average
brand-name prescription was priced 340 percent higher than its
generic equivalent ($65.29 versus $19.33).76
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments increased generic drug entry
in the market, but they were also vulnerable to abuse by brand-

71

CBO REPORT ON EFFECT OF GENERIC DRUGS IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra
note 69, at 28–32.
72
Id. at xiii.
73
Id. at xv.
74
See id. at 38.
75
See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. OF TECH. MGMT. 98, 105–06 (2000).
76
Kirking et al., Economics and Structure of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, 41
J. OF THE AM. PHARM. ASS’N 578, 579 (2001).
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name manufacturers.77 The terms of the original Hatch-Waxman
Amendments created incentives for anticompetitive behavior.
There were three primary abuses: (i) late additions of patents
unrelated to the basic functioning of the drug; (ii) frivolous patent
infringement lawsuits; and (iii) collusive arrangements between
brand-name and generic companies.78
First, innovators abused the original Act by filing
inconsequential patents prior to the expiration of their original
patents in order to prevent competition from generics.79 The
practice of filing frivolous patents furthered the second abusive
practice. By filing these lawsuits, innovators sought to trigger the
thirty-month automatic stay provision on patents that would
otherwise expire.80 The thirty-month stay provision was intended
to allow patent holders to sue potential infringers before they
received FDA approval.81 However, innovators manipulated this
provision by listing multiple, meritless patents with the intent of
creating opportunities to trigger this automatic stay and to reap the
economic benefit of the market exclusivity.82 Lastly, innovators
began entering into competition-stifling agreements with generics
who had been granted a 180-day period of market exclusivity over
other generics.83 Although the 180-day exclusivity provision was
created as a reward to encourage generics to challenge weak
patents,84 it became a device used by innovators to keep all
generics from receiving FDA approval.85 Innovators would pay
the first generic not to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period, thus
indefinitely preventing all subsequent approval of ANDA
applications.86
77

See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 60, at 3–4 (stating that one of the
purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments was to enable earlier generic entry);
Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra note 15.
78
Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra note
15.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 60, at 42.
82
Id. at 52–56.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 62–63.
86
Id.
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II. THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT
In response to the abuses by innovator drug companies of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments’ legal framework, the Senate voted
on June 19, 2003, to include the Greater Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Amendment to the Senate Medicare bill.87 On
June 27, 2003, the House passed its own version of a Medicare
prescription drug bill that also contained provisions for greater
access to generic drugs.88 Finally, on December 8, 2003, President
George W. Bush signed into law the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Modernization Act (“Medicare Amendments”).89
The FDA subsequently revised its rules to be consistent with the
new legislation.90
Title XI of the Medicare Amendments, entitled “Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals,” implemented significant changes to
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.91 In addition to other concerns,
the Medicare Amendments sought to address the various
anticompetitive loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.
Some of the changes include: (i) new remedies for the generic
applicant;92 (ii) new requirements for the events that trigger the
generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity period;93 and (iii)
restrictions on brand-name drug manufacturers’ thirty-month stay
necessary to resolve infringement disputes involving patents listed
in the Orange Book.94

87

Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 1225, 108th Cong. (1st
Session 2003).
88
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, 108TH CONGRESS,
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT, at CRS–11 (updated Jan. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB10105.pdf
[hereinafter CRS HATCH-WAXMAN ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS].
89
21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (1999), amended by 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (Supp. 2005) (including
the amendments made to the statute by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066. (2003)).
90
CRS HATCH-WAXMAN ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, supra note 88, at CRS–6–7.
91
Id. at CRS–7–8.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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A. New Remedies for Generics
First, the Medicare Amendments provide that a generic may
initiate a civil action against an NDA-holder in order to “obtain
patent certainty.”95 Specifically, if the patentee does not bring an
infringement action within forty-five days after receiving
paragraph IV notice, the ANDA applicant may bring a civil action
“for a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the drug for which the applicant seeks
approval . . . .”96 The provision also requires that the ANDA
applicant must offer the patentee confidential access to its
application for infringement evaluation.97 The new cause of action
is primarily designed for the benefit of generics so that they may
control the risk of potential litigation. Prior to the Medicare
Amendments, an innovator could refuse to file an infringement suit
within the forty-five day period following its notice of a paragraph
IV certification, give up the thirty-month stay provision and wait to
initiate patent litigation after the generic had received FDA
approval and had begun to market and sell its product. The
damages awarded in a patent infringement suit are much greater if
a generic had marketed the drug.98 Therefore, if an ANDA
applicant received FDA approval after filing an unchallenged
paragraph IV certification, the ANDA applicant could then either
market its generic product under the threat of a potential lawsuit or
abandon the product. Now, ANDA applicants may obtain
certainty regarding potential patent challenges prior to entering the
market.
The Medicare Amendments also allow the ANDA applicant to
assert a counterclaim to de-list a patent in the Orange Book.99
Although not an independent cause of action, an ANDA applicant
is permitted to assert a counterclaim requiring the holder of the
NDA to correct or delete the patent information on the ground that
95

See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(C) (Supp. 2005).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(II).
97
Id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(III).
98
See Laura B. Pincus, The Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement Actions, 5
HARV. J.L. & TECH, 95, 95–99 (1991) (noting that the fact of patent infringement
establishes the fact of damages because the patentees right to exclude has been violated).
99
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii)(I) (Supp. 2005).
96
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the patent does not claim either the drug for which the application
was approved or an approved method of using the drug.100 This
provision was included in the legislation because a Federal Circuit
case101 had found that the FDA’s duty in listing patents in the
Orange Book is purely ministerial and, therefore, the FDA is under
no obligation to review the appropriateness of the listing.102 The
FDA has no duty to review the patents submitted by the NDA
holder or to assess whether the claims in these patents cover the
approved drug.103 In addition, the FDA does not determine if a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted against
the unauthorized sale of the drug.104 The provision does not permit
the generic to recover damages from a successful counterclaim.105
De-listing counterclaims, however, could serve to facilitate an
early resolution of ANDA patent infringement suits.106
B. The 180-Day Exclusivity Period
Second, Congress addressed the statutory scheme surrounding
the 180-day market exclusivity period awarded to the first ANDA
filer to invalidate the protecting patent. Specifically, Congress
replaced the traditional court decision “trigger” with a more
complex set of provisions.107 The original Hatch-Waxman
Amendments provided that either the first commercial marketing
by the ANDA filer or the date of a district court decision triggered
the 180-day exclusivity period.108 A district court decision trigger
100

Id.
Apotex, Inc. v. Thomson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
102
Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent
Settlements: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 14
(2001) (statement of Gary Buehler, Acting Director, Office of Generic Drugs, Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, Food, and Drug Administration).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Sutherland, Asbill, & Brennan LLP, Legal Alert: Significant Changes for
Prescription Drug Patent Holders, NDA Holders, and Generics (Jan. 30, 2004), at 3,
available
at
http://www.sablaw.com/practice/practice_detail.aspx?sSubType=Z&
iPractice_ID=26126003&sType=A&sPType=A [hereinafter Sutherland, Asbill &
Brennan Legal Alert].
106
Id.
107
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D) (Supp. 2005).
108
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–58 (2003).
101
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forced ANDA applicants to decide whether to market the product
under the threat of reversal by an appellate court or risk loss of the
exclusivity period. Under the new legislation, a district court
decision is not a triggering event, but the first commercial
marketing trigger is maintained, subject to forfeiture.109 These
forfeiture events include: (i) the generic applicant’s failure to
market the drug within seventy-five days of approval or thirty
months after submission of its ANDA, whichever is earlier (or
within seventy-five days of a final decision of an appellate court, if
later); (ii) ANDA application withdrawal or amendment or the
withdrawal of a paragraph IV certification; (iii) failure to obtain
tentative approval within thirty months of an ANDA filing; (iv)
entry into an agreement that is found by the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) or an appellate court to be in violation of the
antitrust laws; and (v) expiration of all patents certified by the
generic applicant.110 If any forfeiture event occurs, the first ANDA
filer loses its 180-day exclusivity period.
Prior to the Medicare Amendments, manufacturers
occasionally entered into anticompetitive agreements in an attempt
to block market entry of competitive generic products.111 In many
of these agreements, a generic manufacturer entitled to the 180-day
marketing exclusivity period would agree to delay launch so as not
to trigger the exclusivity period.112 Because competing generic
applicants could not obtain FDA approval until the expiration of
the exclusivity period, such agreements effectively closed the
market to all generics. 113 As a remedy, the Medicare Amendments
require that all agreements between an ANDA filer (that has filed a
paragraph IV certification) and a brand-name manufacturer or
between two ANDA filers which concern the manufacturing,
marketing or sale of either the brand-name or generic drug or the
180-day exclusivity period be filed with the FTC and the
Department of Justice.114 Past decisions by the FTC indicate that
109
110
111
112
113
114

21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D) (Supp. 2005).
Id.
See supra Part I.C.
Tong, supra note 32, at 793.
Id. at 793–94.
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan Legal Alert, supra, note 105, at 4.
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agreements that include payments by the brand-name manufacturer
in excess of litigation costs and those requiring a delay of market
entry by the generic are those most likely to raise a red flag.115
Although these provisions are in place, the Medicare Amendments
provide that these new forfeiture provisions are not retroactive and
are effective only with respect to those applications filed after
December 8, 2003, for which no paragraph IV certification was
made before December 8, 2003.116
C. Thirty-Month Stay Provision
Third, in response to abuses of the Hatch-Waxman framework
arising from multiple automatic thirty-month stays, the Medicare
Amendments may limit innovators to only one thirty-month stay
per ANDA application.117 As previously mentioned, the FDA has
no authority to evaluate patents listed in the Orange Book.118 Prior
to the Medicare Amendments, each newly issued, newly listed
patent would trigger an additional thirty-month stay, thereby
further delaying FDA approval of any ANDA application.119
Under the Medicare Amendments, only patents listed in the
Orange Book at the time the generic application is filed may
provide the statutory basis for a thirty-month stay.120 Therefore,
patents issued and listed in the Orange Book subsequent to the
ANDA filing are subject to the certification and notice provisions
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments but cannot trigger an
additional thirty-month stay period.

115
W. Edward Bailey et al., Recent Hatch-Waxman Reform: Balancing Innovation,
Competition, and Affordability, http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_NA/107_110.htm
(last accessed Oct. 18, 2005).
116
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108–173, §1102(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (2003).
117
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2005).
118
See supra Part II.A.
119
Michael Padden & Thomas Jenkins, Hatch-Waxman Changes, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 23,
2004, at 13.
120
Id.
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III. AUTHORIZED GENERICS
A number of trends have emerged in the battle between
innovators and generics to capitalize on the lucrative business of
selling pharmaceuticals.
One new and controversial tactic
employed by innovators is the “authorized generic,” which is a
licensing arrangement that allows a generic manufacturer to market
a brand-name drug with a generic label. This results in increased
competition for ANDA applicants. The drug industry has
presented data that more than two dozen authorized generics have
been launched since 2003.121 For example, in January 2004, Eon
Labs (the ANDA applicant) began marketing a generic copy of
Wellbutrin SR, after having secured a 180-day marketing
exclusivity period.122 At the same time, GlaxoSmithKline (the
NDA holder) released an authorized generic, which undercut the
value of the exclusivity period that Eon Labs had been awarded
after challenging GlaxoSmithKline’s patent.123 According to
industry experts, the six-month window during which other
generics are excluded from the market provides immense profits to
the ANDA holder.124 Therefore, if an authorized generic were
released during the exclusivity period, the generic that undertook
the process of challenging the innovator’s “meritless” patent would
not be rewarded with the same amount of profit because of the
increased competition posed by the authorized generic.
In authorizing a generic to market its drug, the goal for
innovators is to retain a portion of the market during the 180-day
exclusivity period awarded to ANDA applicants subsequent to
paragraph IV challenges. Under this type of arrangement, the
authorized generic will usually replace the brand-name
manufacturer’s label with its own.125 Because the authorized
generic is selling the brand-name drug rather than a generic version
of the brand-name drug, its sale is not prohibited during the ANDA
121

Singer, supra note 13, at 1E.
See id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P–0262/CP1, at 4 (June 9,
2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/June04/061004/04p0261-cp00001-01-vol1.pdf [hereinafter Teva Petition].
122
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filer’s exclusivity period.126 As would be expected, such an
arrangement most likely will include an agreement that the
authorized generic share its profits with the innovator in
consideration for the license.127 By selling the innovator’s already
approved drug, the authorized generic sidesteps the HatchWaxman Amendments’ statutory language, which only prohibits
non-approved ANDA applicants from selling the drug during that
period of exclusivity.128
Because the authorization may give another generic company
the opportunity to enter the market quickly even if it is not the first
ANDA applicant entitled to the period of exclusivity, the ANDA
filer who has obtained the 180-day exclusivity period is usually
compelled to lower its prices because of the increased
competition.129 Generics argue that such arrangements decrease
the profits and incentives of the first ANDA filer who assumed the
risk of a patent infringement suit.130
Therefore, allowing
authorized generics to enter the market during that time serves as a
penalty for the applicant who is successful in obtaining a 180-day
exclusivity period.
A. Opponents of Authorized Generics
In 2004, several generics filed Citizen Petitions with the FDA
to seek prohibition of the marketing and distribution of reducedprice authorized generic versions of brand-name products during
an ANDA applicant’s 180-day exclusivity period. In the first half
of 2004, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Mylan”)131 and Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva”)132 submitted petitions to the

126

Id.
See id.
128
See id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Mylan Pharm., Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P–0075/CP1, at 1 (Feb. 17, 2004),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/feb04/021804/04p-0075cp00001-vol1.pdf [hereinafter Mylan Petition].
132
Teva Petition, supra note 125, at 6.
127
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FDA on the issue of authorized generics and Apotex Corporation
(“Apotex”)133 filed a comment in support of Mylan’s petition.
In its February 17, 2004, Citizen Petition, Mylan argued that
authorized generics are “generic” drugs and therefore subject to the
prohibitions on marketing generic drugs during the exclusivity
period awarded to the first generic applicant.134 Mylan further
argued that the “emerging trend” of marketing authorized generics
“will negatively affect the incentive given to generic manufacturers
to challenge drug patents.”135
In the petitions, the generics contend that allowing licensing
agreements between authorized generics and innovators cripples
the generic manufacturer’s ability to derive a higher profit margin
during the exclusivity period, which is when generics usually
recoup the litigation costs incurred in challenging patents.136
Without the financial reward, generics argue they will have little
incentive to challenge patents, especially patents protecting drugs
with modest sales.137 Further, they allege that authorized generics
will eventually obstruct consumers’ access to lower-priced drugs in
the long term.138 At the same time, innovators dispute these claims
by arguing that such licenses promote early introduction of
multiple competitive products and allow consumers expedited
access to lower-priced generics139—goals that are aligned with the
intent of Congress in passing the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and
the Medicare Amendments.

133

Apotex Corp., Comment of Apotex Corp. in Support of Citizen Petition Docket No.
2004P-0075/CP1, at 4 (March 24, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/apr04/040204/04P-0075-emc00001.pdf (filed in support of
Mylan Petition) [hereinafter Apotex Comment].
134
Mylan Petition, supra note 131, at 1.
135
Id. at 2.
136
See Teva Petition, supra note 125, at 6.
137
Id.
138
See Apotex Comment, supra note 133, at 4.
139
FDA, FDA TALK PAPER: FDA SUPPORTS BROADER ACCESS TO LOWER PRICED DRUGS
(July 2, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/2004/ANS01296.html.
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B. Current State of Law Regarding Authorized Generics
The FDA rejected both Teva’s and Mylan’s Citizen Petitions in
a July 2, 2004 ruling.140 The FDA stated that it would not prohibit
authorized generics from marketing an innovator’s drug during the
first ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period.141 The FDA found that
this decision would advance the goal of more rapid access to
lower-priced prescription drugs because authorized generics
increase early competition and allow consumers more rapid access
to lower-priced drugs,142 particularly during the exclusive 180-day
period when the prices for generic drugs are often higher than they
are after other generic manufacturers are able to enter the
market.143 By emphasizing that the FDA does not generally
review business dealings between drug manufacturers,144 the FDA
also clarified that its mission is to protect and promote the public
health.145 The FDA concluded that the marketing of authorized
generics is a pro-competitive business practice, and that, therefore,
it would not intervene as the petitioners had requested.146
In the December 23, 2004 decision, in Teva Pharmaceuticals,
Industries, Ltd. v. FDA,147 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia also refused to intervene on behalf of a
generic’s action challenging the FDA’s ruling.148 The district court
found that the FDA had given effect to the plain and unambiguous
language of the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.149
The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA, holding
that the FDA’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
140

Letter from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning,
Department of Health & Human Services, to Stuart A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer,
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., and James N. Czaban, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe
LLP (July 2, 2004) (denying Mylan and Teva Petitions), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/july04/070704/04p-0261-pdn0001.pdf
[hereinafter FDA Ruling].
141
Id. at 13.
142
Id. at 10.
143
Id. at 12.
144
Id. at 3.
145
See id. at 5.
146
Id. at 13.
147
Teva Pharm., Indus. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2004).
148
See id.
149
Id. at 117–18.
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to law.150 Teva filed an appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals, in the District of Columbia Circuit.151 However, on June
3, 2005, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision.152

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FDA AND DISTRICT
COURT’S DECISIONS
The FDA’s July 2, 2004 ruling153 and the court’s decision in
Teva Pharmaceuticals, Industries, Ltd, v. FDA154 are out of sync
with the spirit of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the
Medicare Amendments. The history of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments clearly demonstrates that innovators will exploit
loopholes in the statutory language to squeeze out as much market
share as possible when faced with generic competition.155 By
taking a strict statutory approach in their decisions, the FDA and
the court in Teva tip the balance in favor of innovator control in the
pharmaceutical market. While this tipping may be a nod to
Congress to again address loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman
legislation, the FDA and the Teva court decisions perpetuate the
cycle of abuse instead of curtailing it. The FDA and the Teva court
decisions suggest that Congress intended to exclude authorized
generics from the requirements and prohibitions imposed on other
generics because authorized generics are not specifically addressed
in the legislation. However, this approach is inflexible to the
design of legislation that was meant to foster a healthy balance
between generics and innovators.
The FDA makes three main arguments in support of its refusal
to prohibit authorized generics from marketing during an ANDA
applicant’s exclusivity period: (i) the authorized generics are
marketing a brand-name product, not a generic product;156 (ii) the
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 117–19.
Teva Pharm., Indus. v. FDA, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id.
FDA Ruling, supra note 140.
355 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2004).
See supra Part I.C.
FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 3–6.
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FDA does not have the authority to regulate commercial marketing
arrangements;157 and (iii) authorized generics do not undermine the
goal of the Hatch-Waxman legislation to bring more affordable
pharmaceuticals to the market.158 These arguments remain
unpersuasive for the following reasons: (i) in a previous ruling, the
FDA found that an authorized generic had marketed a generic
product (rather than a brand-name product) for the purpose of
triggering a 180-day exclusivity period;159 (ii) the FDA has broad
powers to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of
the FDCA;160 and (iii) allowing innovators to license their drugs to
an authorized generic undermines the incentive for generics to
challenge meritless patents. This final factor is contrary to one of
the major provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments—to
promote competition in the pharmaceutical market.
A. Definition of Authorized Generic
First, the FDA’s ruling refused to equate authorized generics
with generics that seek approval through an ANDA filing.161 This
is inconsistent with a previous FDA ruling, dated February 6,
2001,162 and a federal district court decision.163 No language or
provision in the Hatch-Waxman legislation directly addresses the
marketing of authorized generics during an ANDA applicant’s
exclusivity period.
However, opponents of these licensing
agreements argue that no other generic, authorized or not, should
be permitted on the market during the 180-day exclusivity
period.164

157

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 12–13.
159
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476 (N.D. W. Va. 2001).
160
21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000).
161
See FDA Ruling, supra note 140.
162
See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director of Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, Department of Health & Human Services, to Deborah A. Jaskot, Senior
Director Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. (February 6, 2001)
(granting Teva Citizen Petition dated August 9, 2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Mar01/030501/pav0001.pdf.
163
Mylan Pharm., 207 F. Supp. 2d 476.
164
See generally Apotex Comment, supra note 133.
158
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In support of that assertion, opponents cite a case, Mylan
Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson,165 where the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia made
determinations about authorized generics in another context and
supported the February 6, 2001, FDA ruling.166 Mylan began
marketing a version of Pfizer’s Procardia (nifedipine) product
pursuant to an agreement with Pfizer to settle patent infringement
litigation for the drug.167 At the time (prior to the enactment of the
Medicare Amendments), the earlier of a court decision finding the
patent at issue not infringed or invalid, or the commercial
marketing of the drug product by an eligible ANDA, triggered the
180-day exclusivity period.168 The issue in the case was whether
the exclusivity period had been triggered when Mylan began
marketing Pfizer’s drug as an authorized generic.169 Mylan argued
that the 180-day period had not been triggered because no such
court ruling had been issued and Mylan was marketing a version of
Pfizer’s product, rather than Mylan’s own nifedipine product, for
which it had sought approval in the ANDA.170 Nevertheless, the
district court determined that the marketing of an NDA holder’s
product by the holder of an approved ANDA application who is
eligible for 180-day exclusivity for that same drug product
constitutes “commercial marketing” under the statute and triggers
the 180-day exclusivity period.171 The district court agreed with
the FDA’s previous determination that
whether Mylan markets the produc[t] approved in its
ANDA or [whether] the product approved is Pfizer’s NDA
is of little import to the statutory scheme; Mylan has begun
commercial marketing of generic nifedipine, permitting
Mylan to market nifedipine without triggering the

165

Mylan Pharm., 207 F. Supp. 2d 476.
See id.
167
Id. at 481.
168
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–58
(2003).
169
Mylan Pharm., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 481–82.
170
Id. at 483.
171
Id. at 488.
166
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beginning of exclusivity would be inconsistent with the
intent of the statutory scheme.172
Opponents of the FDA’s July 2, 2004 decision, finding that
authorized generics are not prohibited from marketing a brandname drug during the 180-day exclusivity period, argue that the
Mylan decision establishes a precedent for treating “brand generics
as the legal and functional equivalents of ANDA generics for
purposes of applying and enforcing the 180-day exclusivity
period . . . .”173 Therefore, opponents argue, an authorized generic
violates the statute when it markets the brand-name drug during the
180-day exclusivity period of the first ANDA applicant. Even
though the district court in Mylan specifically refers to the
activities of an authorized generic as the “commercial marketing of
generic nifedipine,”174 the FDA’s recent ruling insists that when an
authorized generic markets the drug, it is still a brand-name drug
although it is not identified as such.
The July 2, 2004 FDA ruling distinguishes the Mylan case and
offers another interpretation of the language of the statute. In that
ruling, the FDA argues that, in Mylan, the statutory interpretation
is that the 180-day exclusivity period could be triggered by the
“first commercial marketing” of “the drug” by an ANDA applicant
eligible for the 180-day exclusivity.175 However, the FDA found
that this interpretation was narrowly confined to section
355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and did not
establish a broad policy regarding authorized generics.176 In other
words, “the drug” could mean a generic version or a brand-name
version in this context, as long as the manufacturer who marketed
it was the eligible ANDA applicant. In addition, the marketing by
the ANDA applicant of either of these drugs sufficed to trigger the
180-day exclusivity period.
According to the July 2, 2004 ruling, the Mylan case did not
preclude an NDA holder from “market[ing] or otherwise
172
173
174
175
176

Id. (emphasis added).
Teva Petition, supra note 125, at 3.
Mylan Pharm, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 10.
Id.
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arrang[ing] for the distribution of authorized generic versions of its
own product during a 180-day exclusivity period.”177 The FDA
found further support for this interpretation in its practice of
“allowing NDA holders to make manufacturing changes, including
labeling and imprint changes, that permit the marketing of
authorized generic versions of their products during 180-day
exclusivity periods.”178 The FDA seems to liken licensing
arrangements that permit an authorized generic to distribute an
unidentified brand-name product at a generic price to situations
where an innovator makes minor labeling changes and continues to
distribute the brand-name product at a premium price.
Even though this new tactic may mirror innovators’ previous
maneuvers, the FDA and the circuit court dismiss the spirit of the
Hatch-Waxman legislation by refusing to construe a broader
interpretation of the statute. The FDA’s recent ruling takes a
conservative position by a strict construction of the statute. This
ruling may possibly be in deference to the newness of the
Medicare Amendments. In the period of time between the abovementioned FDA rulings, Congress enacted the Medicare
Amendments, which addressed various loopholes in the HatchWaxman Amendments that had been exploited by innovators.179
However, the Medicare Amendments failed to address the
marketing of authorized generics. In the Medicare Amendments,
Congress addressed the practice by which innovators had been
entering into competition-stifling agreements with generics who
had been granted a 180-day period of market exclusivity.180
Congress created forfeiture events to prevent the practice that
sought to keep an ANDA applicant’s 180-day period from being
triggered.181 Specifically, the first ANDA applicant can forfeit its
180-day exclusivity period by entering into an agreement with
another ANDA applicant, the NDA-holder, or a patent owner
which results in an unfair method of competition.182 Since the
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id. at 11.
See supra Part II.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (Supp. 2005).
See id. § 355(j)(5)(D).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
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Medicare Amendments effectively prevented these competitionstifling agreements,183 innovators have resorted to the present
tactic of the use of the authorized generic. Thus, the purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman legislation is circumvented and the balance is
tipped in favor of the brand-name manufacturers.
Nevertheless, the new licensing arrangements with authorized
generics are a hybrid of the agreements that had previously been
negotiated between innovators and generics and that would now
result in a forfeiture of the ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period.184
In each arrangement, an innovator attempts to capitalize on the
market of a brand-name drug while frustrating a generic’s attempt
to market the drug. Although the current tactic is not used to stop
the 180-day exclusivity period from triggering, the licensing
arrangement creates an artificial generic during a period when no
other generic is supposed to be on the market. Thus, the FDA
disregards the plain meaning of the word “exclusive” in its refusal
to prohibit these artificial generics from marketing a particular
drug during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period. The FDA’s
ruling is contrary to one of the central provisions of the HatchWaxman legislation because it allows innovators to undermine a
generic’s incentive to assume the risk of patent infringement suits.
B. Authority of the FDA
The FDA refuses to recognize its broad power under the FDCA
to prohibit authorized generics from marketing during an ANDA
applicant’s exclusivity period. While the FDA was willing to
make a determination in Mylan185 about the arrangement between
Mylan and Pfizer licensing Mylan to market an authorized generic
version of Pfizer’s Procardia,186 the FDA has recently taken a
hands-off approach to such licensing arrangements. In its July 2,
2004 rejection of Teva’s and Mylan’s Citizen Petitions, the FDA
stated that it “oversees the changes that holders of approved
ANDAs and NDAs make to their products to enable the marketing

183
184
185
186

Id.
Id.
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476 (N.D.W. Va. 2001).
See supra Part IV.A.
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arrangements they wish to pursue.”187 In addition, the FDA stated
that it “does not consider the underlying marketing objectives or
the competitive implications of the changes being made, only their
implications for the public health.”188 Finally, the FDA stated that
it has no duty under the statute to prohibit such marketing or to
afford any right of protection for the ANDA applicant.189
Instead, the FDA characterized its role in the pharmaceutical
industry as the regulator of safety and efficacy.190 Thus, the FDA
focuses on the issue of the bioequivalence in the approval process
of ANDAs.191 This approach also assumes that authorized
generics need not be “approved” because the drug has already been
approved by the NDA holder.192 Therefore, the authorized generic
is characterized as a “manufacturing change,” and the FDA found
that “NDA holders have long made such manufacturing changes as
well.”193 As long as there are no manufacturing changes that pose
safety and effectiveness concerns, the FDA argues that the HatchWaxman Amendments do not prohibit an NDA holder’s use of
alternative marketing practices for its own approved new drug.194
By taking this approach, the FDA ignores its broad power
under the FDCA “to promulgate regulations for the efficient
enforcement of [the FDCA] . . . .”195 This provision empowers the
FDA to implement the FDCA as Congress intended. The FDA
relied on this power in the Mylan proceeding to determine whether
the authorized marketing of Pfizer’s nifedipine product triggered
the 180-day exclusivity period.196 In Mylan, the district court
stated that
an agency[,] in administering a program created by
Congress, must be allowed to formulate policy and make
187

FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 5.
Id.
189
See id. at 2, 4–6.
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See id. at 2, 4.
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21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000); CBO REPORT ON EFFECT OF GENERIC DRUGS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 69, at xii, 2.
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See FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 6–7.
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FDA ruling, supra note 140, at 4–5.
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See id. at 2, 5; Andrx Petition, supra note 8, at 6.
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See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000).
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See Mylan v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481–83 (N.D. W.Va. 2001).
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rules to fill a ‘gap’ which has been left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress. There is an express delegation of
authority to an agency to fill by regulation a gap explicitly
left open by Congress.197
Even though Congress closed several loopholes in the
Medicare Amendments that innovators were abusing, the FDA
refuses to recognize that authorized generics are likely abusing a
loophole that Congress failed to address.
C. Policy
The FDA’s failure to prohibit authorized generics from
marketing during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period
undermines the Hatch-Waxman Amendments’ goal of balancing
incentives for generics so that they are encouraged to challenge
innovators’ patents. Although the FDA asserts a policy argument
in support of its refusal to delay the marketing of authorized
generics, this argument takes a short-sighted and narrow view of
the goals of the statute. The FDA argues that the legislative intent
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is to benefit the consuming
public “‘through the prompt availability of lower cost generic
drugs’ and [] to allow the eligible ANDA applicant to reap the
benefits of 180 days of marketing exclusivity” without competition
from other ANDA applicants.198 The FDA found that its
interpretation is consistent with the principles of the HatchWaxman Amendments because the interpretation
does not unduly favor either first ANDA applicants or
NDA holders; it merely permits NDA holders to pursue
competitive marketing strategies . . . . In fact, a contrary
interpretation arguably would unduly favor first ANDA
applicants, to the detriment of the public interest that is

197

Id. at 487.
FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 10 (quoting Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Deborah A. Jaskot, Senior Director,
Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USC, Inc., in response to Nifedipine Petition,
at 7–8 (Feb. 6, 2001)).
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promoted through encouragement of competition and,
thereby, of lower prices in the pharmaceutical market.199
On the other hand, opponents argue that permitting authorized
generics to market drugs during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity
period interprets the statute in a way that excessively favors
innovators.200 If an NDA holder licenses an authorized generic to
market a brand-name drug at a reduced price during the exclusivity
period, opponents argue that this could reasonably be expected to
diminish the ANDA holder’s economic benefit because there are
three versions of the drug on the market: (i) the brand-name drug,
(ii) the ANDA holder’s generic, and (iii) the authorized generic.201
There is an obvious competition between the NDA holder’s
“generic” version of the brand-name drug and an ANDA holder’s
generic drug. The NDA holder’s “generic” drug would not exist
without the licensing arrangement. Regardless, the FDA found
that any “such adverse economic effect is insufficient to justify the
action requested [], even if the FDA had authority to grant the
request.”202 The FDA argues that competition during the 180-day
exclusivity period actually furthers the objective of enhancing
competition overall among drug products.203 Specifically, the
FDA argued that the competition posed by authorized generics
“can be anticipated to encourage ANDA applicants to offer their
products at lower prices during the exclusivity period, thereby
reducing the substantial ‘mark-up’ ANDA applicants can often
apply during the period, before approval of subsequent ANDA
applicants increases competition.”204
One of the fundamental problems with the FDA’s policy
argument is that it trivializes the purpose of the 180-day
exclusivity period. According to the provisions of the HatchWaxman Amendments, the encouragement of competition and,
thereby, lower prices in the pharmaceutical market, is not a one199

Id. at 11.
Id.
201
Id. at 12.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. Mylan contests that issue, arguing that no pricing data “currently supports the
bald assertion that authorized generics lower prices at a consumer level.” Id. at n.19.
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step process.205 As innovators take financial risks in the research
and development of new drugs, generics take financial risks in
challenging innovators’ patents.
The Hatch-Waxman
Amendments and the Medicare Amendments attempt to balance
those risks with various incentives such as the 180-day exclusivity
period for generics and patent extensions for innovators.206
However, the 180-day exclusivity period serves another purpose as
well. Congress has recognized that innovators have filed multiple,
meritless patents in an attempt to prolong patent life.207 At the
same time, it has been determined that the FDA does not have a
duty to police Orange Book listings to ensure that ineligible patents
are not listed in the Orange Book.208 According to Ben Venue
Labs, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp.,209 the FDA “has
stated that it lacks the resources and the expertise to review patents
submitted with NDAs, and that it intends listing disputes to be
settled privately.”210 Therefore, generics who challenge allegedly
meritless patents are effectively policing innovators from unjustly
maintaining high, monopoly prices on drugs. In support of the
theory that lawsuits are the method to dismantle innovators’
monopoly-hold on the market, a recent FTC study found that when
generics do bring patent challenges, their allegations are
meritorious—”generic applicants prevailed in nearly 75% of the
patent litigation ultimately resolved by a court decision.”211 Yet
the FDA’s failure to prohibit authorized generics from marketing
during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period undermines this
process by tipping the balancing of the incentives in favor of
innovators.
It could be argued that generics will continue to bring patent
challenges regardless of whether or not authorized generics are
around because the potential financial rewards are still present.
Therefore, the legislative goal of increasing the availability of
205

See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (1999), amended by 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (Supp. 2005).
See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1074–76 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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affordable pharmaceuticals may not truly be threatened by
allowing innovators to use authorized generics. Although the longterm effects of this practice can only be speculated, it is clear that
innovators have an added weapon in their arsenal that puts a
damper on a generic’s supposed victory after winning a patent
challenge.
V. ANOTHER APPROACH—LABELING
A. Pending Citizen Petition with the FDA
The FDA has an opportunity to potentially level the playing
field between innovators and generics in a ruling on a pending
petition. In a Citizen Petition filed on December 23, 2004 with the
FDA, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Andrx”) seeks to prohibit the
marketing of authorized generics on another theory.212 Andrx
planned to market a generic form of methylphenidate
hydrochloride, an attention deficit drug, while the NDA holder
McNeil Consumer and Speciality Pharmaceuticals (“McNeil”)
planned to license its attention deficit drug Concerta® to an
authorized generic.213 In a move to block the licensing agreement,
Andrx proposed that authorized generics are misbranded under
section 502(a) of the FDCA and, therefore, are false, misleading
and anticompetitive.214 Specifically, Andrx argued that a drug
label “can convey a misleading representation by implication or by
omission of material information, as well as by express
statements.”215 The FDCA provides in relevant part that “[a]mong
representations in the labeling of a drug which render such drug
misbranded is a false or misleading representation with respect to
another drug or a device or a food or cosmetic.”216 In essence, the
argument is that consumers and healthcare professionals are misled
as to the true manufacturer of authorized generics and are,
therefore, not receiving truthful and accurate information about the
212
213
214
215
216

Andrx Petition, supra note 8.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 6.
21 C.F.R. § 201.6(a) (2005).
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drug product. This works to the detriment of consumers because
they pay more for a brand-name drug—which they assume has a
greater therapeutic effect—when the same drug is actually
available at a lower price.
In further support its argument, Andrx argues that the FDA has
previously prohibited the business practice of mislabeling brandname drugs that mislead consumers.217 Specifically, Andrx makes
a “man in the plant” argument. In the 1970s, some brand-name
pharmaceutical companies employed a practice of hiring smaller
companies to manufacture their drugs for sale with the drug’s
brand-name label.218 To supervise this manufacture, the brandname company would send a “man in the plant” to “supervise” the
manufacturing process.219 Companies then placed their brand on
the label, claiming to have manufactured the drug, and charged the
brand-name price.220 However, the FDA stopped this business
practice, finding that the “man in the plant” supervision was only
nominal.221
Andrx argues that the practice of authorized generics is
essentially similar, although it works in reverse.222 Instead of
placing a brand-name on a product manufactured by a generic, the
practice allows innovators to put a generic label on a brand-name
drug. Consumers are misled by this practice because they buy the
brand-name version while the same drug made by the same
company is available more cheaply.
In response to Andrx’s petition, McNeil submitted an
opposition comment to the FDA on February 25, 2005.223 McNeil
argued that Andrx failed to allege

217

See Andrx Petition, supra note 8, at 7–8.
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McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals, Comment to FDA (Feb. 24, 2005),
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any legally relevant FDCA violation related to generic drug
bioequivalence or adulteration, or any violation of FDA’s
careful and deliberate regulatory process with respect to the
labeling of products approved under both the NDA and
ANDA processes. Although Andrx’s argument is based on
the alleged omission of information from labeling, its
arguments do not satisfy the FDCA’s definition of
misleading labeling found at Section 201(n), which focuses
on the consequences of using the drug as recommended in
the labeling at issue in the light of any omitted material
fact.224
Essentially, McNeil argues that Andrx has failed to identify
any safety or efficacy issue with the labeling of authorized generics
and, therefore, has failed to prove that the label is misleading.225
Section 201(n) of the FDCA provides:
If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the
labeling or advertising is misleading, then in determining
whether the labeling or advertising is misleading there shall
be taken into account (among other things) not only
representations made or suggested by statement, word,
design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the
extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal
facts material in the light of such representations or
material with respect to consequences which may result
from the use of the article to which the labeling or
advertising relates under the conditions of use prescribed in
the labeling or advertising thereof or under such conditions
of use as are customary or usual.226
In a June 24, 2005 letter,227 the FDA delayed its decision
regarding the Petition, due to “other Agency priorities.”228
224

Id. at 4.
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B. The Labeling Resolution
The importance of accurate labeling of drugs is clear for
various safety reasons.
The prohibition of brand-name
manufacturers’ use of the man-in-the-plant approach suggests a
clear concern with practices that mislead consumers or that fail to
disclose to consumers the actual manufacturer of a drug. This
assumes that there is merit in disclosing to consumers the
manufacturer of a drug, even when issues of safety or efficacy are
not implicated.
Section 201.1(a) of the FDCA provides in part: “A drug or
drug product . . . in finished package form is misbranded under
section 502(a) and (b)(1) of the act if its label does not bear
conspicuously the name and place of business of the manufacturer,
packer, or distributor.”229 The FDCA goes on to define such a
manufacturer as one who mixes, granulates, mills, molds,
encapsulates and coats a drug product.230 In addition, the FDCA
provides that the
appearance on a drug product label of a person’s name
without qualification is a representation that the named
person is the sole manufacturer of the product. That
representation is false and misleading, and the drug product
is misbranded under section 502(a) of the act, if the person
is not the manufacturer of the product in accordance with
this section.231
Further, the statute requires that if a distributor is named on the
label, the name shall be qualified by one of several phrases that
specifies the manufacturer of and the distributor of the item.232
To comply with the statute, the FDA should require that
innovators accurately label authorized generics. Specifically,
authorized generics should clearly identify the brand-name
228

Id.
21 C.F.R. § 201.1(a) (2005).
230
Id. § 201.1(b).
231
Id. § 201.1(h)(2).
232
Id. § 201.1(h)(5). Such phrases include “‘Manufactured for _____,’ ‘Distributed by
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‘Distributor: _____,’ ‘Marketed by _____.’” Id.
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connection. If innovators were required to label their products as
such, this might undermine the controversial tactic they are
employing. During an ANDA holder’s exclusivity period, an
innovator will continue to sell its brand-name product at a
premium price. At the same time, the authorized generic will offer
the product at a lower price and pay the innovator a portion of the
proceeds. If an innovator were required to identify the brand-name
connection on the authorized generic’s label, consumer choice
might be affected. If consumers were aware that the authorized
generic’s product is actually the same as the brand-name product,
they would be less willing to pay the premium price for the brandname drug. This may undercut the market of the brand-name drug
sold by the innovator at the higher price. Thus, this simple
disclosure requirement might discourage innovators from making
such licensing arrangements in the first place.
Statutory language constrained the FDA and the federal courts
from altogether banning an innovator’s use of an authorized
generic during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period. Yet, the
statutory language of the FDCA seems to clearly require
authorized generics to bear reference to the brand-name connection
in the labeling of their product.
CONCLUSION
The high cost of healthcare is an issue of the utmost concern.
A recent study found that wholesale prices for popular brand-name
drugs increased by an average of 7.1 percent in 2004, which was
more than twice the general inflation rate.233 At the same time, the
study found that wholesale prices for seventy-five commonly used
generic drugs rose only 0.5 percent in 2004.234 As is clear from the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the Medicare Amendments,
Congress had a clear intent to foster early generic market entry of
pharmaceutical products. One of the central means of fostering
that goal was granting ANDAs the 180-day exclusivity period. In
the congressional hearings that led to the Medicare Amendments,
233
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Representative Henry Waxman stated that in the negotiations that
culminated in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments there “was no onefor-one trading of provisions. Instead, we weighed all of the
provisions to encourage innovation, taken as a whole, against all of
the provisions to encourage generic competition, as a whole, and
concluded that an appropriate balance had been struck.”235 In the
Medicare Amendments, Congress attempted to restore the careful
balance that had been undone by the actions of innovators.
However, innovators have found another loophole in the statutory
language. It took almost twenty years for Congress to consider the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments for revision. However, this was
necessary due to plain abuse of loopholes in the legislation.
Representative Waxman stated that innovators resorted to “creative
lawyering” and “have not honored the careful balance struck by
those Amendments.”236 Innovators are clearly utilizing creative
lawyering again. The history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
should teach that loopholes will be exploited when there are great
financial rewards. Therefore, the FDA should require innovators
to identify the brand-name connection on their labels for their
authorized generic drugs to undercut this loophole which is
undermining the careful balance of the law.
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